Implications of australia and china relationship culture

The Implications of The Rise of China on Australian Foreign Policy

implications of australia and china relationship culture

What might prevent close ties between Australia and China from with heavy consequences, is failure to do the thinking needed about how to. This is my last day in the Australian Public Service, having started in China, then in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, accounted for just. Image courtesy of the artist and Cultural Partnerships Australia.

Different political factions in China found support in Australia: A relaxation in Australia's racial exclusion laws led to broader people-to-people interactions. ByChinese students were arriving in Australia to study in that year alone. An Australian trade commissioner was briefly stationed in China in In the mids, conflict between China and Britain surrounding the Canton—Hong Kong strike created tensions between China and Australia as a dominion of Britain as well.

Following the Northern Expedition in China, greater political unity within China bolstered the Chinese Consulate-General's confidence in criticising Australian laws that discriminated against the Chinese; they were supported domestically by a resolution at the ruling Kuomintang's Third National Conference in Australian rules against Chinese residents and visitors were relaxed in response, including making it easier for Chinese nationals to visit or study in Australia.

The Consulate-General was reorganised and moved to Sydney, with sub-consulates opened in other key cities. Various Chinese officials visited Australia. As a mark of respect, he was given a seat on the floor of the House of Representatives. Frederic Egglestonwho previously headed the Commonwealth Grants Commissionwas appointed the first minister to China in ChongqingChina's war-time capital, while Hsu Modeputy foreign minister, was appointed the first minister to Australia.

The United Kingdom proposed in that Britain, Australia and New Zealand should simultaneously recognise the new government. However, the Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned about electoral repercussions at a time when Communism was becoming a more topical issues, and did not do so immediately. Although Ben Chifley 's Labor government preferred to be realistic about the new Chinese government and would have supported its admission to the United Nations, [6] it lost the election.

The British government went ahead with the recognition of the PRC alone inbut the United States withheld recognition. However, fromAustralia refused to accept ambassadors from the ROC,[ citation needed ] and for many years Australia did not send an ambassador to Taiwan.

From as early asthe Australian government's Department of External Affairs was recommending the recognition of the PRC, but this advice was not politically accepted.

implications of australia and china relationship culture

While the Labor Party 's official policy from was that Australia should follow the examples of Britain and France in recognising the PRC, on the basis that the ROC was unlikely to recover the mainland, [7] the Liberal Party-led Coalition played up the perceived threat of a Communist China for electoral advantage, including the support of the anti-Communist Democratic Labor Party.

As part of this political strategy, Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt explicitly recognised the continuing legitimacy of the ROC government in Taiwan inby sending an ambassador to Taipei for the first time. As opposition leader, Gough Whitlam visited China in before Henry Kissinger 's historic visit on behalf of the United Statesand in Decemberafter Whitlam's victory in that year's federal election, Australia established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and Australia ceased to recognise the Republic of China government of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan.

The establishment of relations with "Red China" roused great excitement in Australia. Since the Chinese economic reforms initiated by the late Deng XiaopingChina has benefited from significant investment in China by Australian companies for example, future Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had set up the first Sino-foreign joint venture mining company in China inwhile Australia has benefited from the Chinese appetite for natural resources to modernise its economy, infrastructure and meet its growing energy demands.

Australia subsequently won and Sydney hosted the Olympics. Eight years later, China hosted the Beijing Olympics in Australia is one of the few countries in the world during the global financial crisis that was not in recession. Its continued economic growth due to that period is partly attributed to large demand and long term strong fundamentals from China.

The national security department of China accused the Australia intelligence agency of trying to collect information from overseas Chinese, and even encouraging them to subvert Chinese government.

Although Hong Kong, as a special administrative area of China, cannot conduct its own foreign affairs, consular and economic representations exist.

implications of australia and china relationship culture

Australia—Taiwan relations While Australia no longer recognises the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China or Taiwanunofficial relations are maintained between Australia and Taiwan. This laid the foundations for rapid growth of diplomatic, cultural and economic links between Australia and China under both the Whitlam and Fraser Governments.

These developments were facilitated by China's efforts to strengthen its ties with the West as a whole, firstly to find allies against the Soviet Union and, following policy changes into boost China's economic growth by opening up to the world economy.

From the early s Australia's dealings with China began to move away from a preoccupation with global strategic issues and to concentrate on regional issues and bilateral economic links. In political terms, the 'special relationship' which Prime Minister Hawke considered had developed between Australia and China came to an abrupt end, however, with the violent suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing in June Concerns about human rights abuses in China ensured that diplomatic relations between Australia and China were frosty for over a year, including a ban on ministerial visits until early Nevertheless, the importance of the commercial links which had grown up between Australia and China in the preceding decade meant that there was little possibility of relations returning to the kind of enmity and suspicion which had characterised the pre period.

Trade and investment between the two countries were unaffected, and the Australian Government emphasised that Australia 'remain[ed] committed to a long-term cooperative relationship with China'.

The focus of the Keating Government on deepening links with the countries of Asia meant that particular attention was given to the relationship with China. At the same time the government was sensitive to continuing domestic and international concerns about China's human rights record and emphasised that relations were maintained with a 'realistic, business-like approach' rather than with the ideas of a 'special relationship' which had marked the pre period.

Prime Minister Keating conducted a successful visit to China in Junewith an emphasis on trade and investment.

Chinese influence and how to use it to Australia's advantage

A Year of Friction Following the election of the Howard Government in MarchAustralia-China relations encountered serious problems as the Chinese Government began to react to what it saw as change in the direction of Australian policy on China.

China had expressed concerned about Australia's increasing contacts with Taiwan duringbut the problems reached a new level in The Chinese perception was fuelled by a number of actions by the Australian Government which Beijing interpreted as together forming a shift away from a previously supportive stance on China towards a position more closely tied with US interests and less friendly to China. The issues over which the misunderstandings developed were an indication of the sensitive nature of the Australia-China relationship and the degree to which the relationship is directly linked to the health of China's relations with the United States.

One China or Two? In March Taiwan held its first fully democratic presidential election. The Chinese Government, in an effort to reassert its continuing claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and to influence Taiwanese electors not to vote for pro-independence candidates, began a demonstrative series of missile tests in the Taiwan Straits. In response, the US Government moved two aircraft carrier groups into the area to monitor the tests and to affirm its interest in the security of Taiwan. One of the first foreign policy actions by the new Coalition Government after its election in March was to call in the Chinese Ambassador to express its concern about the mounting tensions between China and Taiwan.

The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer, also welcomed the US decision to move warships into the Straits as a sign of US commitment to the security of the East Asian region, as 'demonstrating [US] interest in participating in regional security issues in a very practical way'. Chinese Government representatives did not make any particular public response to the position of the government, but subsequent events suggest that they took note of Australia's quick support for the US and began to look for further signs that policy in Canberra was changing with the new government, in particular that Australia was moving away from its 'one China' policy.

China began to register great sensitivity to Australian dealings with the government in Taipei. In July, the Mayors of Beijing and Shenzhen declined to attend an Asian cities' conference held in Brisbane in protest against the attendance of the Mayor of Taipei, Mr Chen Shui-bian, a leading figure in the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

Mr Downer had issued a statement saying that the federal government had no objection to a visit by Mr Chen. Funded as part of Australia's overseas aid program, the scheme had been controversial for some time and the government decided to abolish it as part of efforts to reduce budget expenditure.

The Chinese Ambassador said the move would: We hope that the Australian Government will follow internationally accepted practices and continue to support the projects in the pipeline All these projects have been committed by the two governments. If they are not to be carried out, then it won't be in line with international practices.

But it has also been suggested that the Chinese were particularly concerned that the cancellation of DIFF funding was part of a wider campaign by Western countries to restrict the flow of development assistance to China. Australia's cancellation of projects in China financed through soft loans may have strengthened fears in Beijing that Australian foreign policy was taking on a new pro-US and anti-China character. The 'Claws of a Crab'?

Part of the foreign policy agenda of the new Coalition Government was to re-emphasise Australia's security relationship with the US.

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At the AUSMIN talks the two countries signed a new security declaration and agreed to expand the range of joint exercises, including regular participation by US personnel on Australian soil.

Chinese reaction to the development came quickly and stridently, in the form of a commentary in the official People's Daily. From this we can see that the United States is really thinking about using these two 'anchors' as the craws of a crab The recent moves by the US in Australia show that the Cold War thought process has not changed much in the minds of some people, who still hope to play the role of the global policeman.

Whereas the previous Labor Government paid more attention to building bilateral security relations, the new government has repeatedly emphasised the importance of its traditional allies.

Using the metaphors beloved of Chinese commentary, the article compared Australia to a bat which gave its allegiance to the mammals when they triumphed, but showed its wings and declared itself a bird when the birds were victorious. What countries have seen instead are aid cuts to Asia and speeches by the MP, Pauline Hanson, full of anti-Asian and anti-immigration sentiment. As soon as it was announced that the Buddhist leader and symbol of the Tibetan independence struggle would be visiting Australia, the Chinese Government began protesting against any suggestion that the Dalai Lama would meet the Prime Minister or any senior Australian Government figure.

When the Prime Minister said he would indeed meet the Dalai Lama, the People's Daily launched a particularly strident attack on the Australian government: The statement repeated the warning that the decision would 'unavoidably produce a negative impact on relations between China and Australia'. Nevertheless, senior members of previous Australian governments and parliament had held meetings with the Dalai Lama without the vituperation which marked their reaction to Mr Howard's meeting.

The Chinese have always opposed such meetings but their response on this occasion was at a new level. It is quite unusual for Australian foreign policy to be subject to a repeated critique in the Chinese press.

The View from Beijing The change in the character of Chinese statements about Australia needs to be understood as the product of a general perception in Beijing that Australian policy was being redefined under a Coalition Government.

A number of individual actions without a united objective in mind were interpreted by the Chinese authorities as a co-ordinated policy response. The Australian Government did not appear to appreciate the extent to which Beijing would read a single coherent meaning into the actions. The view from Beijing was that Australia under a Coalition Government was becoming less sympathetic to the Chinese position on highly sensitive issues such as Taiwan and Tibet and was moving to re-emphasise traditional especially US relationships at the expense of Asian connections.

Of particular disquiet from Beijing's point of view, Australia's renewed stress on the importance of the US alliance was seen as a return to a less independent foreign policy which would conform more closely to US interests.

This was regarded with particular concern at a time when China-US relations were being affected by a number of disagreements. Dealing with an Emerging Great Power Following the efforts of senior Australian Government officials and the meeting between the Australian Prime Minister and Chinese President in Manila in Novemberthe government of China brought an end to the hostile public critique of Australian policy. A Chinese presidential spokesman was reported as describing the Howard-Ziang meeting as 'very friendly': One meeting cannot resolve all the problems, but the two leaders have reached a common understanding to overcome our difficulties and keep better relations in the future.

This is the beginning of another stage; that we should keep the momentum going. His comments indicate that the Chinese Government has a generally positive attitude towards the prospects for Sino-Australian relations. Politically and militarily, China and Australia pose no threat to each other.

Economically, the two countries complement each other. Furthermore, there are many opportunities for Australia and China to cooperate with each other in international and particularly regional issues. He said the difficulties in were due to the Australian government taking 'some actions which ended up hurting the national feelings of the Chinese people'. As long as the two countries respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, bilateral relations will continue to develop and the potential for cooperation between the two sides will be enhanced.

Although Australia's relations with China have undergone a qualitative change during the last decade and are no longer framed in predominantly geopolitical terms, the Chinese leadership still conducts all its international affairs with broader regional and global implications in mind.

Containment, Engagement and Australia-China Relations Chinese perceptions of how it is regarded in international affairs are still strongly influenced by suspicions that the US and to some extent Japan and other Western powers harbour a desire to prevent China from taking its place amongst the major players on the world stage. Chinese officials look back on a history in which China saw itself as the 'Middle Kingdom' to which the rest of the world paid tribute, followed by a hundred years of humiliation and incursions into its sovereignty by foreigners.

When the Chinese people 'stood up', as Mao put it inand embarked on a new effort to rebuild their country, the US instituted a policy of 'containment' which the Chinese Government considered was an attempt to keep China weak and isolated. These crucial underlying factors in China's relations with the countries of the West became especially evident in the discord which affected US relations with China beginning from Relations deteriorated over a number of issues: US actions over Taiwan and strategic issues began to be read as signs of a return to the policies of 'containment'.

Beijing feared that while professing to seek 'constructive engagement' with China, the US actually wanted to contain the rise of a rival superpower. Australia is seen as a faithful long-term ally of the US which supported the US during the Vietnam War and the Cold War and emulated the US policy of recognising the Taiwan regime as the legitimate government of China.

Australia-China: Not just 40 years

At the same time, Australia is appreciated for its capacity to act independently of the US, including trading with China during the s and s and recognising the PRC insix years before the US. During the s, Australia's close relationship with China also played a small role in facilitating China's economic and political opening to the world in the post-Maoist era.

Australia also expressed its disagreement with US efforts, in andto link China's MFN status with the issue of human rights. Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities remain highly sensitive to any perceived changes in Australia's strategic and economic outlook and are especially wary of any moves to return to what could be seen as a slavish emulation of the US.

implications of australia and china relationship culture

While Australia and China have, since the s, developed a strong bilateral relationship based on shared interests, China still handles its affairs with individual countries in the context of global strategic relationships. As Australia's bilateral and regional involvement with China grows in the future, a key challenge for Australia's policy-makers will be to balance the demands of the relationship with China while maintaining close strategic and economic ties with the US.

One of the central dilemmas for both Australia and the US will continue to be the question of Taiwan. China under the current regime would never accept a formally independent Taiwan, but Taiwan has been effectively independent for many years and is becoming an increasingly important economic player in the region, lobbying with growing effectiveness for a more regularised status in the international community. The contrast of Taiwan's transition to democratic rule with the authoritarianism and suppression of human rights in China has been instrumental in winning Taipei many supporters in the US, particularly in Congress.

Any change in policy on Taiwan in either Washington or Canberra would jeopardise the even more important relationship with Beijing, yet the pressures on the current ambiguous arrangements can only grow in the future. The issue of Hong Kong is not fraught with the complexities of Taiwan's status, but the territory's reunification with China in July has many potential problems, not only in terms of their implications for US-China relations but because of Australia's direct bilateral interests.

Hong Kong is a very important trading partner for Australia whose economic future is of great interest for Australia, and Australia will be unable to stand aloof from the tensions which may develop over the issue of political freedom and human rights in the territory under Chinese rule. Economic Growth and Political Uncertainty The growing importance of relations with China for Australian policy-makers is set to continue because China is maintaining rapid economic growth even while entering a period of political uncertainty.

International attention has focused even more on this uncertainty since the death of Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese economy has sustained an average annual growth rate of almost ten per cent over the last decade and is projected to become the world's second largest economy within the next ten years. China's growth, together with Australia's greater relative economic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, have led to a twenty per cent average annual increase in Australia's exports to China over the last five years.

China is currently Australia's fifth largest trading partner and if the trade figures with Hong Kong were to be added after reunification in Julythe total would rank third after Japan and the US. Chinese investment in Australian agriculture and minerals has expanded considerably in recent years. China's economic success has boosted the confidence with which the Chinese Government is conducting its foreign relations and asserting its position in regional territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands, 28 in its relations with powers such as the US and Japan and over issues such as human rights.

While China's military capability is limited and its armed forces are only at the beginning of what will be a long process of modernisation, the country's rapid economic development provides the necessary conditions for its eventual rise to the status of a major military power. The effective debunking of Maoist ideology following the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping has meant that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has come to rely on its capacity to deliver access to material wealth.

But the benefits of the new approach have not flowed evenly to the Chinese people. In contrast with the shared backwardness of Maoist China, regional disparities are widening as well-situated provinces take advantage of new opportunities while poorer regions experience far less growth. The rise of market-driven economics has uprooted millions of people in search of work and thrown the future of millions of workers in old state-owned industries into doubt.

With rising visible poverty and crime, many Chinese perceive that the benefits of economic growth are being monopolised by a corrupt minority.

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The suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Junewhich arose partly to protest against such problems, further weakened the legitimacy of the Communists and has led them to depend increasingly on the power of the armed forces. The Party continues to shrink from any ideas of political liberalisation for fear of the complete loss of control which brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Meanwhile the continuous growth of the privately-owned economy and of foreign trade is steadily diminishing Beijing's control over the functioning of the economy and its capacity to exercise power over the daily lives of the Chinese people. Although Deng held no formal office fromhe was still a figure of immense authority until his death on 19 February His passing may exacerbate internal tensions and contest for power within the Party leadership.

His death will, at the very least, throw popular attention back onto the issue of the role of the Party. It was the spreading of a factional dispute within the Party into the streets in early which provided a catalyst for the mass movement which culminated in the events around Tiananmen Square in June While Deng's death is unlikely to provoke an immediate crisis, the future course of the process of political change in China could profoundly affect the character of Chinese foreign policy.

With the loss of Maoist ideology, the Party leadership has already increasingly emphasised its role as the defender of Chinese nationalism. As Michael Yahuda has argued, trends towards aggressive nationalism in foreign relations could be heightened if there is division or uncertainty during the process of succession: The less disruptive [the succession] may be, the more likely it is that a self-confident leadership will emerge that would be able to pursue China's sovereignty claims with moderation The more difficult the succession the more likely that a weak leadership would respond erratically and assertively to perceived challenges, especially if it were dependent upon the armed forces who are imbued with more virulent nationalist sentiments.

China is rapidly integrating into the world economy, but the state structures which made integration possible are slow to reform and adapt to the new Chinese society that economic change is creating. The Chinese Government understandably expects that the country's emerging status as a leading world economy should be given due recognition in global institutions and affairs, but some parts of the international community still consider that China does not conform fully to the established norms of international relations.

For its part, the Chinese Government, mindful of the fear and suspicion with which it is regarded in some quarters in the US, tends to interpret any pressure to reform its institutions and politics as a new form of anti-Chinese containment.

Moreover, any policy or action by a foreign power which suggests a questioning of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan is regarded as an act hostile to the interests of the entire Chinese nation. These issues are fundamental to the background against which Australia must conduct its relations with China. As a key element in Australia's economic and strategic environment, China will occupy an increasingly central part of discussion about Australia's foreign relations in the future.