Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently [Roger W. Barnett] on guiadeayuntamientos.info how to conduct naval warfare, retired naval officer and Naval War College professor Emeritus Roger Barnett opens the Related Video Shorts (0). The some form of a Grand Strategy and strategic culture. term strategic culture . This directly aspects related to maritime activities to maximize defines the)N s. Consider some of the forces which determine the strategic culture of any nation. of strategic culture, within the context of its related definitional terms. it to explain the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union, after concluding.
As retired Indian Admiral Rakesh Sharma observes, Quasi-religious orders prohibited Indians from making voyages overseas ostensibly to stem the brain drain of Indian mathematicians and philosophers migrating to Baghdad, the Silicon Valley of the times sic.
Its export of religion and culture over the centuries to that region has led to it being seen as a distinctly non-threatening state. Pye distinguishes between the Indian and Chinese influences, noting, Not only did India introduce Buddhism to Tibet, Central Asia, China, Japan and Southeast Asia, but its Hindu and Mogul cultures introduced the concept of god-kings and sultanates which shaped the traditional systems of Southeast Asia.
Although Sinic culture has had an impressive impact on Korea, Japan and Vietnam, it has come in a poor second to the Indian culture in attracting other peoples. In time, though, this trade ceased and India turned inward.
Consequently, trade with other regions was left to Arabs in the west and other civilisations in the east. In colonial times, the British Raj, too, was more concerned with continental issues than maritime, leading to the further neglect of the navy.
In total, there were twenty three major warships, including one aging aircraft carrier. While government policy may have been responsible to some extent for this lack of action, the fact that long-range ships were so scarce as to make any retaliatory action impossible provides a better reason. In their place are one more modern aircraft carrier, fourteen operational submarines and 34 major war ships. There are also eight world-class hydrography vessels, which have completed several major oceanographic surveys in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans for the Indian Navy.
This growth may be measured by three parameters: Indian Navy in — The Indian Navy has remained more or less static in the number of its ships. It is the number of ship-borne missile cells available today that indicate its modernisation. This begs the question, why is India modernising its navy? Does it, like China, seek regional hegemony? These questions are best answered by examining its process of modernisation, the types of vessels being built and acquired, and its maritime strategy.
Missiles first made their appearance in the Indian Navy in during the Indo-Pakistani War, when they were used in Operations Trident and Python to effectively neutralise the Pakistani Navy in Karachi for the term of the war.
The Klubs have been replaced by the Brahmos missiles on the very latest Talwar-class ships being built in Russia. Building an aircraft carrier is one of the biggest and most complex tasks of any navy. India planned to build a twenty thousand ton carrier, but its tonnage was soon expanded to forty thousand. Additionally, the Indian Navy has purchased the refitted Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, as its second carrier.
A third carrier, designed to accommodate thirty fighter aircraft, is being built at the Kochi Shipyard in Kerala, India. They carry fighter aircraft, primarily to take the battle to an enemy and move it away from the homeland.
As such, they are offensive by their very nature. The Indian Navy plans to operate three carriers by However, while the general contours of a move towards regional hegemony are discernible, further examination is needed to determine if this is the case.
The Indian Navy also has engineers at Mazagaon Docks in Mumbai, where the Godavari-class ships were designed and built fromand the previously-noted facility at Kochi.
Since ship-building is an important facet of seapower, the question must be asked: Up to this point, this study shows that the Indian Navy has not increased in size but has been modernised, it has plans to obtain three aircraft carriers, and it has a comparatively minor ship-building industry. These observations produce conflicting signals, making it difficult to determine if India has regional naval aspirations.
This study must examine its maritime doctrine to make a determination. Correspondingly, its military doctrine has also undergone significant change. India has fought four wars since independence in and as its economic and political power grew, its military situated these experiences into its doctrine. Indian leaders wanted the military to rapidly mass its troops on the Pakistani border, threatening overwhelming conventional attack on that country if it did not cease its support for attacks on India by groups based there.
The military, however, was incapable of such rapid deployment. Panikkar, the document implies that the Indian Ocean is, in a singular way, Indian.
The Maritime Doctrine is designed to maintain Indian autonomy and security against any regional threat. It also considers the PLANs power projection abilities using aircraft carriers. The Maritime Military Strategy emphasises three new issues: The Indian Navy is primarily focussed on a possible confrontation with Pakistan.
This was made evident during the Kargil Crisis in when it was used to blockade the Pakistani Navy, preventing vital supplies from reaching Karachi.
Margolis again observes, In coming decades, geopolitical tensions between the two uneasy neighbours and rivals easily could intensify as they vie for hegemony over South and Central Asia, Indonesia and even the South China Sea, political influence, oil, resources and markets. Since relations were normalised inthis view has been modified to an extent but fundamentally remains the same. These concerns have been compounded over the last twenty years with five categories of Chinese activity in the IOR.
Raja Mohan, conceives of an Indian maritime strategy premised on three concentric geographic circles. Again the naval document does not treat this area in as starkly plain terms as Mohan does. It could be argued, however, that the acquisition of aircraft carriers is purely deterrent in nature and cannot be construed as being offensive in this case.
India has emphasised its requirement for a dominant position in the north-eastern IOR and more so towards the western approach to the Malacca Strait since the s. This, according to Brewster, is part of a broader strategy of projecting power into the main entry and exit choke points of the Indian Ocean.
Examining the Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: Part 4 – India’s Maritime Strategy
Simply put, a country s strategic culture can explain its Overall, ndia s strategic culture is best explained when security behavior. Also, rivalry and violence would be conceived as behaviors based on that country s geography, history irrational because military conflict cannot be sustained and economic and political development.
Interaction as economic globalization moves forward. For among these symbols can forge a collective national neoliberals, force is an outmoded and blunt instrument identity distinct from other countries, while also unsuited to the new world order Bajpai, The limiting the social and cultural environment of its Narendra Modi doctrine is close to explaining strategic decisions Johnston, He John Duffield claimed that a country s security culture mentions vikas vaad development and vistar vaad is formed by the strategic preferences of the entire expansionismboth characteristics of a Grand Strategy, society and political elites on some policies and actions strategic culture and neoliberal thinking.
He also suggests that actual state behavior security in their relations with one another.
Realism representative of a strategic culture must be based on posits that international relations are determined by a preferences that anchor the thinking of decision-makers constant state of war that interdependency gives rise to which will determine government policy Johnston, coercion among states in the form of balancing, Arun Prakash states that ndia s maritime history bandwagoning or hedging.
Neo-liberalists agree, but is a description of past events, on what happened and emphasize that economic strength is the ultimate basis not why it happened Prakash, Methodologically, for military power Bajpai, They argue further Prakash suggests that it has left research on ndia s that economic well-being is akin to power which can be strategic culture in a void. However, sincethe more effective than military power.
Therefore, due to the Indian navy has produced a strategic framework for the inter-dependence among states, relations need not be deployment of maritime forces in peace and in war based on force.
According to Bajpai, in situations of Prakash, In this essay, we will focus on scattered complex inter-dependenceforce is unuseable or writings in the press, academic journals, think tank ineffective Bajpai, It will refer to three documents, power which can be more effective than military power.
According to Strategy for the 21st Century and Nonalignment Bajpai, In conclusion, this essay will analyze In the Indian context, the neo-liberalist approach to Narendra Modi s thoughts for the Indian Ocean and researching strategic culture is the most relevant.
These may be gleaned This essay hypothesizes that, first, India does have a from various texts written over time by statesmen, strategic culture but is somewhat muddled and not yet soldiers, scholars, commentators, and diplomats Bajpai, conceived of concretely due to the absence of an Second, that India does have a as religion, myths and legends with historical memories grand strategy paradigm about operational policy in the of ancient states and civilizations.
Discourse security policies and how they affect their relations with on these two hypotheses includes an historical other states. The latter is reflected in a state s strategic understanding of ndia s actions in its maritime doctrine.
At the height of the Cold War, answers backed up by the government. Sincethere have were sought after to questions about the origins of been government announcements and on-going strategy and how policy decisions on strategy were commentaries by think tanks like the National Maritime formulated Al-Rodhan, For example, the United Foundation that there may indeed be a strategy for the States and the Soviet Union as well as their satellite Indian Ocean ….
Also decisions to protect their national security. The significant is the establishment of the National Security discourse centered on the role that culture played in Council set up in which suggests that India has safeguarding their respective spheres of influence. The some form of a Grand Strategy and strategic culture. N aims to achieve conventional deterrence by mplications for Limited Nuclear Options Al-Rodhan, maintaining a preponderance in conventional maritime He defined strategic culture as the sum total of capability, i.
Given the dominant location of strategy Snyder. Strategic such a maritime force can guarantee the safety of culture is an integrated set of symbols i. Analysts have called this strategy parts: The first is the central strategic paradigm—the as ndia s Monroe doctrine —referring to the US basic assumptions about orderliness in the world.
The second part is intervention. On similar lines, the Indian subcontinent grand strategy, or the secondary assumptions about was seen as a single geographic and strategic unit.
This operational policy that follow from the prior understanding, combined with the colonial experience J. What is ndia s attitude first aim was instrumentalised by denying autonomous towards war and the use of military force to attain tendencies of the smaller neighbors, particularly if they political ends? Is it informed by a definite strategic tried to bandwagon with extra regional powers. The three doctrines were written in the hope of second aim was aided by Non-alignment, which was answering these questions.
With regard to the first meant to be the practice of realpolitik cloaked in doctrine, Indian Maritime Strategyndia s idealism Padukone, An Indian worldview informs Grand Strategy, statecraft?
This is not a question that one normally so indirectly reflects what the strategic culture of that expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear nation may be. In the Indian context, her worldview is weapon state…. But India achieved colored by a detachment of the political establishment independence….
This may explain to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both the lack of a tangible, composite strategic culture in ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics India. Having said that, India does have an historical Menon, In post-Colonial times, ndia s relevant conceptual conundrum about the use of power political and maritime decision makers have been in Indian state behavior.
In the late s, India had reference to similar examples in antiquity, historical adopted a long-delayed naval acquisition program memory, myth, or other texts written over time. Prakash under which the IN inducted a second aircraft carrier further comments that this demonstrates the inability and a nuclear attack submarine along with numerous of Indian statesmen to apply themselves sufficiently, to warships, submarines and aircraft Prakash, Both Menon and This threw India into the international limelight when Prakash allude to the fact that with the Doctrine, the cover of Time magazine Asia Edition was titled India had failed to achieve any political end-states with was titled e As Superpower Time Magazine Asia the aid of military operations.
They opine that India did Edition, 3rd April, For the first time, there was not have a strategic culture to draw upon.
The basic room for India to articulate a Grand Strategy. How problem was that there was a detachment of the India sees itself is critical to this undertaking. Therefore, India was still in a strategic cultural which India sees herself.
First concerns the economic void to which no national security paradigm could refer component of Grand Strategy. India began managing Prakash, In the post-Cold War era however, it is be an extension of the Doctrine with some shifting to a vision that has greater room for exceptions. It was released after the Indian Navy IN globalization and a greater acceptance of market forces had acquired hardware, systems and weaponry, as well Tellis, Second, India has focused on building as trained human resources reminiscent of a state capacity, trying to balance the state and market in professional maritime force.
The document was a achieving room for globalization while minimizing force planning document which set out the capabilities security competition.
All three strategies fall within the required for its execution Prakash, This time, neo-liberalist framework mentioned earlier. These were, in the In chapter 2, the evolution of recent maritime history is fashion styled by Sun Tzu himself, Military, Diplomatic, given prominence.
Going back tondia s maritime Constabulary and Benign roles Prakash, These vision was captured in the first Naval Plans Paper. The four basic missions represent deterrence in ndia s IN would acquire cruisers and destroyers, to be situated Grand Strategic thrust. Deterrence, at the Grand around small aircraft carriers in order to protect the Sea Strategic plane, involves the use of nuclear weapons as Lines of Communication SLOC and merchant shipping political instruments of state policy, their actual use and trade.
From the Doctrine, defend territory. This rationale was to dominate Indian it is clear that India had officially formulate the Grand military thinking for the next half of the century Strategy, this being a component of strategic culture and Freedom to Use the Seas, Three to nine chapters one step closer to an Indian worldview.
This directly aspects related to maritime activities to maximize defines the N s Grand Strategy, but is silent on where it national gains Freedom to Use the Seas, Also, is derived from. Impressive, but it begs the question of it is mentioned that the partial fulfillment of ndia s what the ancient, mythical, or methodologically scientific Grand Strategy is inevitable, given that ndia s maritime investigations into the N s evolution of strategic strategy has economic, commercial, political, military, thinking.
Here again, we are left to infer a strategic scientific and technological facets Freedom to Use the culture, albeit a muddled one which is not explicitly Seas, A section of the document discusses the represented. It says Doctrine is obvious; that an enquiry into the traditions, values and evolved from government s policies.
Strategy is derived institutional culture of the Indian Navy IN warrants from doctrine. If a strategy brings success, it reinforces examining a wider range of factors that constitute her doctrine Freedom to Use the Seas, A statement of a former Chief of Naval this does not sufficiently explain the role of strategic Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, inmentions that culture from which the IN can draw upon. At best, it is In military terms, both conventional and non- assumed but muddled in the comparison of doctrine conventional, we neither have the capability nor the and strategy.
Geraghty, Chapters 1 and 2 of Doctrine present ndia s Although India is uncomfortable with China s perspectives on and implications of Indian maritime growing footprint in the IOR, it has no intention of history. They stress the fact that without doctrine, India jeopardizing its delicate relationship with China, or could not develop a strategy without a point of precipitating their ties into irreversibly and overtly reference.
So, one can assume that it is a step closer hostile territory. As late astherefore, the two towards the establishment of a strategy based on a point countries continue to engage in subterranean of reference, i. We can assume this because, over to overall confrontation. India is somewhat even though India remains a young nation-state— tentative and unsure about the use of power.
In somewhat tentative and unsure about the use of power response to Tanham s analysis of ndia s strategic Prakash,she has three substantial doctrines culturea contemplative Indian would survey which stress the need to project power, catalyze the contemporary strategic environment and ask partnerships, build trust and create interoperability, and relevant questions like, why were invasions over its when required, use convincing power to achieve north-western passes never stopped or defeated?
This, were rulers of Indian states unwilling to unite against too, alludes to ndia s strategic culture. These probing questions India s newly-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi s reflect the notion that India and more directly, the IN main drive is a stable and secure growth that will make are aware that some form of strategic culture can and India economically stronger.
Commenting on the should emerge. To stress this point, in the second half Bharatiya Janata Party BJP manifesto, Modi said, of the 20th century, there emerged public discourse, led The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the by ndia s national security establishment, in the area foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner of national security strategy. An independent group of that locates India s global strategic engagement in a new academics were tasked with examining ndia s strategic paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited environment.
The product was a doctrine entitled to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, Nonalignment 2. What are the strategic and security dimensions of Modi s Nonalignment 2. Modi s neoliberal approach is essentially always refers to power hard and softand now, in one of engagement with potentially-hostile powers, this new document, India has proven that a strategic including China. Most importantly, Modi is expected to aspiration of creating a new and alternative replace an Indian mindsetfrom thinking South Asiato a universalitythe key word here being universality larger area, i.
The report further states East.
Strategic Culture and Its Relationship to Naval Strategy
The IOR is a strategic link from the Straits of that ndia s primary strategic interest is to ensure an Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca making it a highly open economic order Non-Alignment 2. Neo- volatile span of sea water in terms of global stability. To contemplate India s finance Non-Alignment 2. This mindset will realizes that their primary aim is to maintain have to look at India as playing a leading role in other territorial integrity which encompasses land, sea and regions which are connected by the Indian Ocean.
It also includes the protection of trade regions are Southeast, Central and West Asia.
For routes, access to resources and protection of the instance, India cannot fight a globally operated and Indian diaspora Nonalignment 2. It can be coordinated terrorist and fundamentalist menace by argued that as part of ndia s strategic culture, India being confined to one particular geographic region, i. The role has to be more forwardly offensive being available under a nuclear overhang rather than defensive.Aspects of India’s evolving naval strategy in the Indian Ocean
Under Modi, a resurgent India Nonalignment 2. This means the shaping of must get her rightful place in the community of nations ndia s military power must have a significant and international institutions. The role of hard have prompted India to coordinate with other countries power as an instrument of state is to remain ready to in the IOR that are equally affected by such be applied externally or internally in pursuit of developments.
India should focus on improving relations political objectives Nonalignment 2. Bi-lateral and multi- J. Modi has deep trust in Indian values Modi has to focus also on the leveraging of India s soft that allowed for a thriving Indian sea power. For power, the building of Brand Indiaespecially in instance, according to Sardar K.