U.S. - Sudan Relations | U.S. Embassy in Sudan
Sudan-US relation. Sudan-US Relations. The Political Climate. Sudan and the United States enjoy a long history of friendship and cooperation. Though. Eventually, Sudan might provide to the United States an additional source of energy supply 3 This article contends that, although US-Sudan relations had. When the US decided to remove economic sanctions on Sudan last tempestuous relationship with Washington, it allowed the politicians.
Embassy operations in Khartoum in In Octoberthe U. In Auguston accusations of manufacturing chemical weaponsthe U. The owner of the factory took the case to court demanding compensation, as U. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carneydeparted post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since. Embassy is headed by a charge d'affaires. Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11 attacks in on New York and Washington.
However, although Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list. Bythe United States had another strategic interests in the African continent due to the presence of oil. Darfur and Kordofan"may be the areas richest in oil in the entire country. Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan.
Sanctions continue to underscore U. Sudan has often accused the United States of threatening its territorial integrity by supporting referendums in the South and in Darfur. Despite policy differences the U.
In a similar drought inthe U. For fiscal yearsthe U. However, relations between both countries have, at least, the hope of improving due to President Obama 's sending of Special Envoy Scott Gration to Sudan to improve diplomatic conditions, and discuss ways to avert the current Darfur conflict.
As Zachary Karabell argued, the US may attempt to accommodate fundamentalism but to contain it will almost certainly fail.
Likewise, he viewed the Islamic movement as political and religious as well as revolutionary. The Arab-Islamic Sudanese model condemns Western values and institutions, which promote secularization, including the separation of religion and the state. Turabi blamed the separation of politics and Islam on Western imperialism, which "disestablished Islam, destroyed public institutions and replaced the Sharia with French or British positive law.
Turabi questioned US opposition to radical interpretations of Islam exported to other nations, adding that, if the US should attempt to crush the Sudanese Islamic fundamentalist model, such a move would necessitate strong opposition. The Americans, Turabi asserted, are unlikely to pursue such an enterprise, as this would provoke a great Jihad and the Sudanese would turn into terrorists and target Americans. The Gulf War was a blessing in disguise because it turned the Islamist movements into mass movements and radicalized Islam in Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic masses have taken control and many governments and movements are being undermined. They must go or perish. As a result, a low-level diplomatic presence was established in the fall of as new sympathies with the Christian and anti-slavery movements in the south emerged. United States and Sudan 15 Sudan had been jointly under Anglo-Egyptian administration rule since Init achieved independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom. Upon independence, the US was one of the first powers to extend recognition to the new country.
US interest in the Sudan rested on ending the country's war in Darfur, fostering democratic norms, religious and cultural tolerance, and ongoing assistance in the counter-terrorist effort.
For the most part, US-Sudan relations have been characterized by ups and downs tainted by the Cold War, Arab-Israeli tensions, the war in southern Sudan, support for international terrorism, human rights abuses, and what US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, termed "genocide" in Darfur. The new government in Sudan distrusted and resented US support for Israel and perceived the superpower as the new colonial power following Great Britain.
Many in the Sudanese government, particularly the pro-Egyptian and left-wing groups opposed US assistance, and Vice-President Richard Nixon was welcomed with anti-US demonstrations during his March visit. The various administrations faced problems of factionalism, a weak economy, and ethnic dissidence. Following the military takeover by General Ibrahim Abboud inSudan did not take the side of the US in its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union but, like its predecessor, established closer links with Abdul Nasser's Egyptian government who had close ties with the Soviet Union.
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To make matters worse, it expelled foreign missionaries in Sudan continued to enjoy a cordial and enhanced relationship with the Soviet Union, which provided it with some mostly military advisors, accounted for 18 percent of imports, and acquired 25 percent of Sudan's export.
In addition, as an Arab League member, relations with other members remained a key feature of Sudan's foreign policy. Thus, siding with the Arab nations and accusing the US of complicity with Israel, Sudan declared war on Israel in June and broke diplomatic relations with Washington. With this, the US presence in Khartoum was reduced to a few diplomats housed in the Netherland's embassy. Following the coup, there was no change in US-Sudan relations. Nimeiri supported Nasser's pan-Arabism and, like Egypt, established close ties with the Soviet Union, which provided Sudan with arms.
However, ina dramatic shift occurred when Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement in a communist attempt against his government. This resulted in a break in Sudanese-Soviet relations, as Nimeiri aligned his country with the US against objections from Egypt and the Arab nations. Moreover, Sudan's new alliance with the US also stemmed from a long-felt threat by the political ambitions of Ethiopia and Libya.
However, owing to mounting pressure, Nimeiri commuted the sentences of the assassins inwhich to the US was tantamount to freeing the terrorists. In the face of Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa in the mids, and with the incorporation of Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere of influence, the US sought to limit the spread of communism in the Horn.
As a result, Washington's relations with Nimeiri began to improve and Sudan became a bastion against communism. In addition to his arbitrary rule, including the implementation of strict Sharia laws inadvocating such punishments as the amputation of limbs for stealing 43 and public flogging for alcohol consumption, inept management of the economy and the famine caused by the drought led to mass discontent and crystallized opposition, which led to his downfall.
Moreover, the hanging of Mahmoud Taha, the Republican Brother's Reformist Movement leader who was condemned for apostasy, also triggered Nimieri's downfall. Ironically, as Washington's relations with Nimeiri's Sudan peaked, his popularity at home fell precipitously.
Finally, following a mass riot, Nimeiri, while in Washington seeking more economic assistance, was toppled by a military coup in April Nevertheless, under Nimeiri, the US and Sudan experienced, for the most part, closer relations during the Reagan administration.
Vice-President George Bush, Sr. Therefore, Dhahab moved away from his predecessor's close relationship with the US, embraced the policy of neutrality, and developed closer ties with the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Dhahab alienated the US by discarding Nimeiri's anti-Libyan policies and improving relations with Ethiopia. Libya and Sudan signed a military agreement in US concern over the growing presence of Libyan and other terrorists, along with the dismantling of Nimeiri's dreaded security apparatus expert surveillancesignaled to Washington that Sudan might be veering away from its traditional Western and Egyptian supporters.
Relations further deteriorated following the US bombing of Libya on 15 April Calkins, a US embassy communications officer in Sudan, was shot in the head.
U.S. – Sudan Relations
US ambassador to Sudan, G. Norman Andersonvisited Mahdi to express Reagan's support for Sudan's democratic process and his readiness to assist the country. On Octoberhe visited Washington but was disappointed when he could not meet President Reagan. To maintain Sudan's independence and non-alignment stance, Mahdi requested the removal of US equipment light transport vehicles, hospital supplies, and equipment from Port Sudan.
Even though Mahdi's government pursued a non-alignment policy during much of his tenure, relations with the US remained important, as Washington continued to be a major donor of humanitarian assistance.
Under pressure from Turabi, he instituted a radical, extremist, and ideological government based on the Sharia law. As was stated earlier, Bashir was a disciple of Turabi, the power behind the revolution. Bashir perceived this as unfriendly and accused the US of interference in the country's internal affairs. The US responded by accusing Khartoum of hindering foreign aid distribution and seizing relief supplies.
Consequently, given the existing political environment and tension between Khartoum and Washington, the Bashir government mistrusted US motives when the US proposed a peace initiative to end the north-south civil war.
In MayBashir rejected US proposals for a ceasefire. His anti-Western stance, support for Iraq during the Persian Gulf war, and criticism of the presence of Western forces on Islamic holy lands further strained relations between the two nations.
In Februarythe US withdrew its embassy personnel and closed its embassy in Khartoum. During the Clinton administration, the US believed Sudan supported international terrorism and declared it a "rogue state" along with Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya, placing Sudan on the state sponsors of terror list on 12 August In calling for the sanctions, the Clinton administration stated that "the policies and actions of the government of Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constitute an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
As William Langewiesche remarked, "Scorned as fundamentalists by their opponents, the Sudanese leaders prefer a less loaded label — they call themselves Islamists. Since coming to power inthey have turned their nation into the second radical Islamic state, after Iran. Their success in attaining power has had compelling effects on all of North Africa and much of the Middle East, where many countries teeter on the brink of their own Islamic revolutions. This has disturbed the West.
In defending US action, President Clinton contended: I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security. Our target was terror.
Our mission was clear: The US further claimed that financial transactions linked bin Laden to the plant and that soil samples secretly collected outside the plant contained traces of EMPTA a precursor chemical for VX. Furthermore, the Sudanese contended that the bombing of al-Shifa was based on false accusations and poor intelligence.Sudan After the Sanctions: Sudanese Views of Relations with the United States
Independent tests conducted by the Chair of the Chemistry Department at Boston University, who headed a team to Sudan to investigate the plant, gave it a clean bill of health. His report concluded that based on the soil samples taken around the factory, and "To the practical limits of scientific detection, there was no EMPTA.
Khartoum called several times for a UN investigation into the bombing and argued that, rather than the US becoming the world police, it was in favor of a multilateral approach to global problem-solving through the offices of the UN. Some Wilsonian idealists would agree with this view: Stephen Morrison, argued that the US policy of unilateral isolation and containment of the Khartoum government failed to achieve desired results.
Throughout the Clinton era, U. Ambiguities persisted over true U. The United States pursued these multiple ambitions simultaneously, with little attention paid to whether regime change was achievable or how these diverse and seemingly contradictory policies would be reconciled. These ambiguities encouraged the mistaken belief in Khartoum that the United States was engaged in a covert war to overthrow the Sudanese government.
The ambassador indicated that Sudan would mobilize the Arab, Islamic, and African nations against America's trend of intervening in the domestic affairs of Islamic and Arab nations. He insisted that America's persistence in intervening in Sudan's internal affairs was disguised under the umbrella of human rights.
During the periods of the hostile relationship between the two nations, the US, through its Agency for International Development, provided millions of dollars for humanitarian relief efforts.
Thus, through the s, Sudan-US relations grew increasingly hostile as many American officials perceived Khartoum as the principal threat to US interests in East Africa.
Inthe US prevented Sudan from succeeding Namibia as the African member of the ten non-permanent Security Council members, and defeated efforts to lift UN sanctions against Sudan, which had been imposed following the June attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
The culprits had fled to Sudan. As a signal that the US appeared ready to improve relations, the US abstained from the lifting of UN sanctions against Khartoum because it was cooperating in counterterrorist efforts, including the provision of intelligence. Khartoum reacted unfavorably following the passage of the Sudan Peace Act insisting that the US had passed one resolution after another to punish the government of Sudan.
On 13 Junethe House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act intended to speed up the relief effort and achieve a comprehensive solution to the war in the south.
The act forbade foreign oil companies with oil operations in Sudan from selling stock or other securities in the US. Seek a UN Security Council resolution for an arms embargo on the Sudanese government; Instruct US executive directors to vote against and actively oppose loans, credits, and guarantees by international financial institutions; Take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny Sudan government access to oil revenues in order to ensure that the funds are not used for military purposes; Consider downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations.
This led to six major accords between the north and the south, including the Machakos agreement separating church from state and granting the south the right to a referendum on independence after six yearsresolution of the Abyei conflict, security arrangements, protocol on the resolution in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, power sharing, and wealth-sharing agreement. Following a reassessment and a move to further strengthen the Sudan Act on 23 Decemberthe Bush administration signed into law the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.
Besides ending the conflict and reducing human suffering, the Act was to stimulate freedom and democracy. Shift in United States-Sudan Relations: The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it and destroy it where it grows.
Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Along the same lines, then Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated: Classified as a "state supporter of terrorism," Sudan came to the support of the US by offering to clean out terrorist networks off its soil.
InSudan also claimed it repeatedly offered to turn bin Laden over to the US but Washington refused. Instead, as Ahmed explained: Yet from throughMadeleine Albright and her Assistant Secretary for Africa, Susan Rice, apparently preferred to trust their instincts that Sudan was America's enemy, and so refused to countenance its assistance against the deepest threat to US security since Carney noted that American inability to seize this opportunity had serious implications for US national interest.
A case in point was the US embassies bombings in Furthermore, Carney added, the US lost access to a treasure of material on Saudi-born bin Laden and his network. It appeared the US was in an awkward position with its Sudanese policy as it sought to include a repressive radical, militant Islamic Sudan classified as a "rogue state" and a "state sponsor of terrorism" in an anti-terrorist effort.
This was the first high-level contact between the two countries in years. Khartoum condemned the attacks and said it would cooperate on the war on terrorism.
Relations between the two appeared to have improved as the US encouraged the cooperation of Sudan in its fight against international terrorism. In fact, it has so far shared its files on suspected terrorists with the US and restricted their financial transactions. For example, it has disclosed the following: Sudan's mukhabarat, its version of the CIA, has detained al-Qaeda suspects for interrogation by US agents; The Sudanese intelligence agency has seized and turned over to the FBI evidence recovered in raids on suspected terrorists' homes, including fake passports; Sudan has expelled extremists, putting them into the hands of Arab intelligence agencies working closely with the CIA; The regime is credited with foiling attacks against American targets by, among other things, detaining foreign militants moving through Sudan on their way to join forces with Iraqi insurgents.
As a result, the US has sent security and anti-terrorism experts to Sudan. Sudan's cooperation on the war on terrorism signaled a new turn in US-Sudanese relations, which have led to the softening of the prevailing tension between the two nations.
Sudan–United States relations - Wikipedia
This policy was further enhanced as the US supported the UN's lifting of the travel ban from the country. Likewise, Sudan seized the opportunity to possibly be removed from the blacklist of sponsors of terrorism. Yet, this great achievement was marred by the ongoing Darfur conflict and growing instability in north east Sudan. The Darfur Crises 39 The Darfur conflict, which began in Februarycomplicated international attempts to end the country's instability and kept US-Sudan relations tense.
Since the fighting began, hundreds of thousands at leasthave been killed and more than 2. Darfurians blamed Khartoum for the region's underdevelopment and neglect.
The government reacted to the rebellion ferociously, using Sudanese Air Force helicopters and planes to attack villages suspected of supporting the rebellion. The US declared that the Sudanese government's military forces and the government-backed militias, the Janjaweed, bore the responsibility for the Darfur atrocities, where a consistent and widespread pattern of violence had been directed against non-Arab individuals and villages.
This greatly angered the Sudanese who saw this as "moving the goalposts" with regard to removing Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions steadily declined and the security situation worsened. Currently, funds are urgently needed in Darfur to maintain the African Union AU force in the region mandated by the Security Council, to provide equipment and logistics, as well as sufficient humanitarian aid.
Despite the ceasefire, Janjaweed and rebel attacks continued. The AU endeavored to bring about African solutions to African problems the move resulted in failure and absolved the West from interfering but the international community failed to support the AU by providing adequate resources as the AU was near bankruptcy.
A UN plan to send a man peacekeeping force into the region in December was rejected by the Sudanese government. The idea was to replace the exhausted African Union force which is small, ill-equipped, and poorly funded. However, Khartoum continues to oppose international demands for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur.
Bashir fears that the deployment of a UN force will be likened as Western invasion and that UN forces might arrest government officials implicated in the Darfur crisis. Khartoum insists on no blue helmeted peacekeeping mission in Darfur but would welcome technical support staff by the UN that would not engage in peacekeeping operations.
Unfortunately, the ongoing opposition resulted in delays in the deployment of a UN force mandated to protect civilians under the UN charter.
The DPA was the first step toward ending the violence in the region. Consequentially, the fragile DPA fell apart, and failed to end the fighting but accelerated the violence. In addition, Kenneth H. Bacon, president of the advocacy group Refugees International informed President Bush: This had the effect of further alienating many Darfurians from Khartoum.
Our lives have only gotten worse since it was signed. Bush also cautioned Minnawi that his force "must refrain from instigating violence. US inability to garner a concerted multilateral effort with key European partners to move toward its position and apply pressure upon Khartoum greatly hampered America in achieving its foreign policy objectives.
Along similar lines, the Bush administration sought a diplomatic resolution of the north-south war rather than containment and isolationism. As the parties in the southern Sudanese conflict stumbled toward peace, US diplomacy and leadership kept the negotiations moving ahead and uninterrupted. Working with Norway, the United Kingdom, Kenya, and African actors, the US laid the ground work for ending the southern civil war and for putting in place the foundations for a just and lasting peace.
Finally, it seems that American policy toward Sudan has been successful as both warring parties in the Sudanese conflict signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 Januaryending 21 years of Africa's longest-running, brutal civil war that claimed the lives of more than 2 million people and left millions of dislocated Sudanese as well as widespread devastation.
At first, this historical moment no doubt greatly contributed to promoting Sudan's better image before the global community. However, the atrocities and genocide in Darfur tarnished Khartoum's accomplishment.