Leif wenar why rawls is not a cosmopolitan egalitarian relationship

Leif Wenar | Blain Neufeld - guiadeayuntamientos.info

48 7 Leif Wenar holds the Chair of Ethics at the School of Law, (This principle is 86 Rawls's Law of Peoples describes relations among liberal societies because of 87 . Wenar L () Why Rawls is not a cosmopolitan egalitarian. practical problems of foreign relations with non-liberal states? 65 Leif Wenar, “Why Rawls is not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” in Rawls's Law of Peoples: A. Leif Wenar . In opposing the cosmopolitan egalitarian interpretation Rawls faces the . relations—not with the nature of persons and their proper relations.

Recent Work on Rawls's Law of Peoples: Critics versus Defenders | Gillian Brock - guiadeayuntamientos.info

Consequently, it is upshot of the analysis advanced by Milanovic and Wenar 84 a proposal for advancing global justice, according to is, first, that Rawls is unjustified in extending the demo- 85 Wenar, that is both realistic and ecumenical in character.

However, 95 national self-interest in their foreign relations.

This assumption is that private dona- 98 those subject to them. Wenar maintains that the only tions to international nongovernment organizations 99 source of political ideas acceptable to all reasonable per- NGOsor government funds given to such organiza- sons and societies in the modern world, and thus the only tions, straightforwardly alleviate suffering.

Consequently, a cosmopolitan account mation, we cannot know what obligations we have toward of international justice cannot satisfy the requirement of the distant poor. Rather, he argues that we need to justice an account whose principles all refer to individ- improve our knowledge of the relative success and failure uals is impossible.

Since territory is property, and rates of different kinds of aid programs. Obtaining such a system of property can be stable only if the rules that information requires, inter alia, greater standardization govern it the system of entitlements, distribution, and so and impartiality in the assessment of aid programs.

Aid programs administered by respon- integrity of the person cannot be specified without refer- sible non-corrupt and non-authoritarian local govern- ence to their respective territorial affiliations, that is, the ments, Wenar notes, have been successful precisely nation-states of which they are citizens.

Instead, liberal societies theory of global justice, and consideration of what duties do not go to war with each other because their political individuals have to alleviate global poverty. In addition, Rawls believes three international organizations would be chosen: In The Law of Peoples,iv Rawls aims to derive the laws to which well-ordered peoples would agree. Rawls argues that the Law of Peoples he endorses is a realistic utopia.

It is realistic because it takes account of many real conditions, by for instance assuming a fair amount of diversity exists in the world; not all peoples of the world do or can reasonably be made to endorse liberal principles. He specifies two conditions that govern its being realistic: First, he concerns himself only with liberal peoples and the principles they would endorse.

He employs two original positions to derive his Law of Peoples for liberal peoples: The first original position covers, by now, familiar territory.

The parties in the original position must decide the fair terms of cooperation that will regulate the basic structure of society. Now a second original position is employed to derive the foreign policy that liberal peoples would choose. The representatives of peoples are subject to an appropriate veil of ignorance for the situation. Rawls specifies that for a people to count as a decent one, at least four central conditions must be met.

First, the society must conduct its affairs in ways that are peaceful and respectful of other societies.

John Rawls

Second, the system of law and its idea of justice must secure basic human rights for all members of the people. However, it is important to realize that at this stage in the argument, the list of particular rights that Rawls gives is very short. He thinks all peoples whether liberal or non-liberal should be able to endorse this pared-down list of human rights.

The third condition a decent people must satisfy is that judges and others who 4 administer the legal system must believe that the law incorporates an idea of justice according to which there is a common good. Rawls briefly perhaps all too briefly argues that a decent people would accept the Law of Peoples he earlier derived. He points out that decent people would be obliged to endorse it, given the commitments they would have by definition of what counts as a decent people.

Leif Wenar, Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian - PhilPapers

Rawls then turns to describe a case of a hypothetical decent people, Kazanistan, that he believes fulfills his requirements. Kazanistan is an idealized Islamic people in which only Muslims are eligible for positions of political authority and have influence in important political matters, though other religions are otherwise tolerated and encouraged to pursue a flourishing cultural life.

Liberal societies should tolerate states such as Kazanistan. This defines the target of assistance. According to Rawls, the political culture of a burdened society is all-important to the levels of prosperity experienced in particular societies: Rawls argues against this for a couple of reasons, but notably, as we have just seen, because he believes that wealth owes its origin and maintenance to the political culture of the society rather than say to its stock of resources.

Furthermore, any global principle of distributive justice we endorse must have a target and a cut-off point, which are secured by ensuring the requirements of political autonomy. Any principles of global redistribution must have a target and a cut-off point. For Rawls, these are achieved when just institutions are in place that can ensure political autonomy. By contrast, Rawls believes that since cosmopolitans are concerned with the well-being of individuals, there is no obvious cut-off point at which redistribution ceases in the global arena, and this result is problematic.

One of the most frequently raised objections is that the background picture Rawls invokes incorporates outmoded views of relations between states, peoples, and individuals of the world. Rawls presupposes that states are sufficiently independent of one another, so that each society can be held responsible for the well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, according to Rawls, differences in levels of wealth and prosperity are largely attributable to differences in political culture and the virtuous nature of its citizens.

Critics point out, however, that Rawls ignores both the extent to which unfavorable conditions may result from factors external to the society and the fact that there are all sorts of morally relevant connections between states, notably that they are situated in a global economic order that perpetuates the interests of wealthy, developed states with little regard for the interests of poor, developing ones.

We who live in the affluent, developed world cannot thus defensibly insulate ourselves from the misery of the worst off in the world, since we are complicit in keeping them in a state of poverty.

Any group that exercises effective power in a state is recognized internationally as the legitimate government of that territory, and the international community is not much concerned with how the group came to power or what it does with that power.

Oppressive governments may borrow freely on behalf of the country the international borrowing privilege or dispose of its natural resources the international resource privilege and these actions are legally recognized internationally. These two privileges have enormous implications for the prosperity of poor countries because they provide incentives for coup attempts, often influence what sorts of people are motivated to seek power, help maintain oppressive governments, and, should more democratic governments get to be in power, they are saddled with the debts incurred by their oppressive predecessors, thus significantly draining the country of resources needed to firm up fledgling democracies.

All of this is disastrous for many poor countries. Because foreigners benefit so greatly from the international resource privilege, they have an incentive to refrain from challenging the situation or worse, to support or finance oppressive governments.

For these reasons, the current world order largely reflects the interests of wealthy and powerful states. Local governments have little incentive to attend to the needs of the poor, because their being able to continue in power depends more on the local elite, foreign governments, and corporations.

Not only do critics argue that Rawls ignores the extent to which societies suffering unfavorable conditions frequently result from global factors, but they also maintain that the boundedness and separateness of political communities is difficult to sustain in our world today, due to phenomena such as globalization and integration. However, critics argue this is an untenable assumption. Some authors argue that we have a system of global co- operation between societies and this gives rise to obligations to the worst off.

That structure should be transformed so that it becomes a fair scheme of cooperation among all citizens of the world. Another common complaint is that the notion of a people is not sufficiently clear or important to do the work Rawls thinks it can do. If we take a people to be constituted by commonalities such as shared language, culture, history, or ethnicity, then the official state borders and peoples do not coincide well.

National territories are not typically comprised of a single people, nor is it clear that individuals belong to one and only one people. But why assume this? Another common observation is that Rawls provides little argument for why decent societies would endorse even the limited set of human rights that Rawls offers initially. In neither the case of decent peoples nor liberal ones would the precise list Rawls offers be chosen, and moreover it is noted that the attempt to find a politically neutral law of peoples acceptable to both peoples is not promising.

Rawls argues for a respectful relationship between states as representatives of peoples. Indeed, he argues that liberal democratic regimes have an obligation to deal with illiberal decent regimes as equals, and not to endeavor to impose their values on them. Andrew Kuper argues that Rawls may take cultural pluralism seriously, but he does this at the expense of taking less seriously the reasonable pluralism of individual persons.

Indeed, it would seem that Rawls, in defending non-liberal states as he has, would be forced to defend the rights of states to impose inegalitarian policies on its citizens, even if a majority of the citizens were vigorously against such policies. There is also a debate about what the appropriate unit of toleration should be: Liberalism does, in certain cases, require commitment to tolerance of views that are not liberal.

However, critics argue that the appropriate object of toleration should be legitimate differences among individuals, not peoples, as this ensures better tolerance of legitimate differences where they matter, namely, among individual persons. Furthermore, the view is not very utopian in that the ideals used are too tame to constitute much of an advance over the status quo.

In his bow to realism, Rawls has tried to ensure that the Law of Peoples results in stability, yet the Law of Peoples he endorses might be quite unstable because it involves tolerance of unjust regimes, which are potentially much less stable than just ones and it is organized around comprehensive conceptions of the good, something he vigorously rejects in earlier works. It is often pointed out that critics have failed to appreciate some salient issues that orient Law of Peoples.

As Samuel Freeman emphasizes, Law of Peoples is commonly misunderstood to be asking questions like what is the nature of global justice or what would a globally just world order look like?

In particular, how should liberal peoples relate to non-liberal peoples? Should they tolerate and cooperate with non-liberal peoples, or should they try to convert non- liberal peoples to liberal ones? What are the limits of what liberal peoples should tolerate with respect to non-liberal peoples? This constitutes a more limited project than trying to come up with say, an entire theory of global justice.

While liberal peoples should tolerate decent peoples, this is not the case with outlaw regimes. It is not reasonable to expect all decent societies to conform to all the norms of a constitutional democracy as a requirement of peacefully coexisting and cooperating with them.

According to Freeman, this stance does not entail that citizens of liberal states must refrain from criticizing illiberal societies. The phrase suggests that he is trying to determine the conditions under which a utopian world order might be possible, albeit that he constantly emphasizes that it is to be realistic. If securing a peaceful world order is our primary objective, we should sanction coercion only in the most essential cases. The notion of legitimacy plays a key role. As Leif Wenar observes: Yet the laws of a legitimate basic structure are sufficiently just that it is justifiable to enforce them.

Moreover, the laws of a legitimate basic structure are sufficiently just that 14 foreigners may not permissibly intervene to attempt to change these laws. Without peace there can be no justice, so establishing a peaceful order does seem to be the first crucial step in an international law of peoples.